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Comments
Assessing the First Amendment as a
Defense for WikiLeaks and Other




WIKILEAKS FIRST CAUGHT the public’s attention in the United
States in April 2010 with the release of the video “Collateral Murder,”
showing American soldiers shooting at unarmed civilians, two Reuters
journalists, and children from an Apache helicopter.1 The organiza-
tion subsequently spurred a global debate regarding its “release of
thousands of confidential messages about the wars in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan and the conduct of American diplomacy around the
world.”2 Continuing this trend of revealing previously undisclosed and
embarrassing government information,3 WikiLeaks published 765
classified prisoner dossiers from the military prison at Guantanamo
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acknowledge Professor David Greene and the University of San Francisco Law Review staff,
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1. Collateral Murder, WIKILEAKS, http://www.collateralmurder.com/ (last visited Jan.
9, 2012); Tim Arango & Elisabeth Bumiller, For 2 Grieving Families, Video Reveals Grim Truth,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2010, at A8.
2. WikiLeaks, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/or-
ganizations/w/wikileaks/index.html (last updated Jan. 12, 2011).
3. This Comment will primarily use the general term “undisclosed government infor-
mation.” The sources cited in this Comment use other more specific terms such as “na-
tional security information,” “confidential government information,” and “classified
government information,” which all have their own distinct definitions. However, these
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Bay, Cuba in April 2011.4 WikiLeaks’ mission statement suggests that
its activities provide a public service by exposing important, otherwise
hidden information:
WikiLeaks is a non-profit media organization dedicated to bringing
important news and information to the public. We provide an in-
novative, secure and anonymous way for independent sources
around the world to leak information to our journalists. We pub-
lish material of ethical, political and historical significance while
keeping the identity of our sources anonymous, thus providing a
universal way for the revealing of suppressed and censored
injustices.5
Nonetheless, some see the organization’s lofty goal of trans-
parency as posing a serious threat to U.S. national security.6 Vice-Pres-
ident Joe Biden called WikiLeaks founder Jullian Assange a “high-tech
terrorist” because, through leaking U.S. documents, Assange has “put
in jeopardy the lives and occupations of people in other parts of the
world,” and “[h]e’s made it difficult to conduct our business with our
allies and our friends.”7 Further, Peter T. King, Chairman of the Com-
mittee on Homeland Security, commented, “Julian Assange and his
compatriots are enemies of the U.S and should be prosecuted under
the Espionage Act.”8
Currently, the United States government has refrained from im-
posing criminal or civil liability on WikiLeaks for the disclosures; how-
ever, in December 2010, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) launched
an investigation into its options for possible prosecution of WikiLeaks
and Julian Assange.9 This investigation was announced in response to
specific terms collectively belong within the general category of “undisclosed government
information.”
4. The Guantanamo Files: WikiLeaks Reveals Secret Files on All Guanta´namo Prisoners,
WIKILEAKS, http://wikileaks.org/gitmo/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Guantanamo
Files]; Greg Mitchell, The WikiLeaks Blog: The Guanta´namo Files, THE NATION (Apr. 25, 2011,
7:18 AM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/160135/wikileaks-blog-guantanamo-files
(tracking revelations by newspapers all over the world learned from the prisoner dossiers
on the day the information was released).
5. WIKILEAKS, http://wikileaks.de/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2012).
6. See Stephanie Strom, Pentagon Sees a Threat from Online Muckrakers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
18, 2010, at A18.
7. Biden Makes Case for Assange as a ‘High-Tech Terrorist,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 19,
2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/19/joe-biden-wikileaks-assange-high-
tech-terrorist_n_798838.html.
8. Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on Homeland Sec., King Re-
Introduces Bill to Strengthen DOJ Authority to Prosecute Leaks of Intelligence (Feb. 15,
2011), available at http://homeland.house.gov/press-release/king-re-introduces-bill-
strengthen-doj-authority-prosecute-leaks-intelligence.
9. Charlie Savage, U.S. Weighs Prosecution of WikiLeaks Founder, but Legal Scholars Warn
of Steep Hurdles, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2010, at A18.
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outcry from political leaders over the release of government cables
about the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.10
The government’s displeasure over these releases is evidenced by
the detention of Private Bradley Manning. Manning, the soldier be-
lieved to have leaked the Collateral Murder video, Iraq War Logs,11
and Afghan War Diaries,12 has been held for nearly two years on
“charges of handing government files to WikiLeaks[ ] [and] has not
even been tried let alone convicted.”13 Manning spent eight months
in solitary confinement, and he is currently awaiting a court martial.14
The law is settled after Garcetti v. Ceballos that there is no First Amend-
ment protection for government employees who leak previously un-
disclosed information.15 However, beyond extracting a confession
10. See Charlie Savage, U.S. Prosecutors, Weighing WikiLeaks Charges, Hit the Law Books,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2010, at A10. Senator Joseph Lieberman stated, “I certainly believe that
WikiLeaks has violated the Espionage Act, but then what about the news organizations—
including The [New York]Times—that accepted it and distributed it?” Id. He continued: “To
me, The New York Times has committed at least an act of bad citizenship, and whether they
have committed a crime, I think that bears a very intensive inquiry by the Justice Depart-
ment.” Id.; see also Scott Shane, Keeping Secrets WikiSafe, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2010, at WK1.
“Representative Peter King, a New York Republican, has asked the State Department to
consider designating WikiLeaks a terrorist group; Senator Dianne Feinstein of California,
the Senate Intelligence Committee’s top Democrat, has called for espionage charges
against Mr. Assange, an idea that legal experts say is problematic.” Shane, supra.
11. This release contained 400,000 classified U.S. documents about the Iraq War,
leading at least one government oversight group to estimate that “around 15,000 previ-
ously unknown civilian deaths would be identified.” WikiLeaks: Iraq War Logs ‘Reveal Truth
About Conflict,’ BBC NEWS (Oct. 23, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
11612731. The Iraq War Logs provided the public with accurate data to chart the War’s
death toll. See Simon Rogers, WikiLeaks Iraq War Logs: Every Death Mapped, GUARDIAN DATA
BLOG (Oct. 22, 2010, 7:05 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/interactive/
2010/oct/23/wikileaks-iraq-deaths-map.
12. The Afghan War Diaries were a smaller scale release containing 90,000 documents
that likewise revealed previously unreported civilian casualties. WikiLeaks ‘Afghan War Diary’
Provides Ground-Level Account of Afghanistan War, HUFFINGTON POST (July 25, 2010), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/25/wikileaks-afghan-war-diary_n_658743.html. These
documents were “reports from junior officers in the field that analysts use to advise policy-
makers, rather than any high-level government documents that state U.S. government pol-
icy.” Id.
13. Editorial, The Abuse of Private Manning, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2011, at A34 (describ-
ing Manning’s imprisonment conditions as “abusive”).
14. Patrick Worsnip, U.N. Torture Sleuth Urges End to Long Solitary Terms, REUTERS (Oct.
18, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/18/us-un-torture-solitary-idUSTRE79
H7HF20111018.
15. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (holding that the First Amend-
ment does not protect a public employee making statements pursuant to their official du-
ties); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, The Espionage Act and National Security Whistleblowing After
Garcetti, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1531, 1540–41 (2008) (explaining that due to the Supreme
Court’s holding in Garcetti, government employees are completely unprotected constitu-
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from Manning, what evidence the government will use to establish a
link between Manning and Assange is unclear: “One major hole in the
case against Assange is the lack of any evidence that Manning gave the
information to Assange.”16
Furthermore, since publication of the leaked material was done
in concert with the world’s top traditional media outlets, including
the New York Times, Der Spiegel, Le Monde and El Paı´s,17 is there any
logical way to distinguish these newspapers from WikiLeaks for the
purpose of liability? There are some commentators who argue that
they should be treated equally:
Assange arranged for these five principal world news organizations
to be co-equal publishers with WikiLeaks. As such, they are co-
equally guilty with Assange under the Espionage Act. To charge
Assange and not charge, for example, The New York Times, would
lead to devastating charges of unfairness both outside and inside
the courtroom. As Assange is guilty, so are the five publications.18
Since First Amendment jurisprudence currently draws no distinction
between individuals and the press,19 and as we will see, neither does
the Espionage Act,20 the argument for equal treatment is legally
sound. Nonetheless, prosecution of the New York Times, one of the
world’s most respected, traditional media outlets, seems unlikely given
the potential political fallout. Attorney General Eric Holder suggested
in a recent interview that the mainstream media would not face prose-
cution because they were not as culpable as WikiLeaks: “They acted, I
think, in a responsible way so I think that is at least one of the distinc-
tions[.]”21 While Holder believes the newspapers were less culpable
because of their responsible behavior (thus far unsupported by facts),
tionally or statutorily for whistle blowing if they gained access to the relevant information
as part of their professional duties).
16. James Ching, Journalism WikiLeaks Style, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 10, 2011, at 38.
17. Mark Thompson, The Future of Journalism in the UK, REUTERS MEDIAFILE (Sept. 26,
2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/mediafile/2011/09/26/the-future-of-journalism-in-the-
uk/; Ravi Somaiya & Alan Cowell, WikiLeaks Founder Said to Fear ‘Illegal Rendition’ to U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2011, at A6.
18. Ching, supra note 16. R
19. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press . . . .”); DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 206–07 (3d ed.
2010) (noting that the media tends not to receive special constitutional protection because
(1) it would be difficult to provide a workable definition of the press; and (2) the Constitu-
tion should protect the individual just as much as the media).
20. Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 792–799 (2006).
21. Mark Matthews & Lilian Kim, Holder Talks WikiLeaks, Terror Stings in Bay Area Visit,
ABC7 KGO-TV (Dec. 11, 2010), http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/politics
&id=7837935.
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this is not the current legal test for liability and is merely a policy
choice to treat WikiLeaks differently from other publishers.
Overall, this Comment seeks to answer whether WikiLeaks can
and should be held liable for disclosing truthful information about a
matter of public concern, though the information was originally un-
lawfully obtained. This question raises fundamental issues regarding
the tension between the First Amendment and the Espionage Act.
Furthermore, the WikiLeaks situation questions the press’ ability to
publish on matters of public concern that are also undisclosed govern-
ment information. While recognizing that the law in this area is unset-
tled, this Comment asserts that the Supreme Court’s recent decision
in Snyder v. Phelps,22 which embraced the broad definition of “matters
of public concern,” read along with Bartnicki v. Vopper,23 the most re-
cent in the Daily Mail line of cases,24 suggests a step toward categorical
inclusion into First Amendment protection for all truthful informa-
tion on a matter of public concern when the publisher innocently re-
ceives information illegally obtained by a third party.
This categorical approach would provide heightened First
Amendment protection to all publishers on matters of public con-
cern. Thus, given Snyder and Bartnicki, WikiLeaks has a plausible con-
stitutional defense to civil and criminal liability for publication of
leaked, previously undisclosed government information.
Part I of this Comment begins with a discussion of the policy de-
bate over a publisher’s freedom to disseminate facts about important
public issues, including government secrets that are unlikely to result
in immediate, irreparable harm. Part II analyzes two possible legal ave-
nues for shutting down WikiLeaks: (1) prior restraint; and (2) the Es-
pionage Act, specifically sections 793 and 798.
Part III outlines the Daily Mail principle, through the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Landmark Communications, Smith v. Daily Mail Pub-
lishing Co., and Florida Star v. B.J.F. Part III also assesses this principle’s
effectiveness as a defense. This section also points out two post-Bart-
nicki cases decided by lower courts that frame the outer limits of a
possible categorical inclusion for all innocent publishers: (1) Peavy v.
WFAA-TV, Inc., which applied intermediate scrutiny when the journal-
ist participated in the illegal interception;25 and (2) United States v.
22. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
23. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
24. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97
(1979); Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
25. Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158, 190–91 (5th Cir. 2000).
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Rosen which held that the First Amendment is not a defense to crimi-
nal liability under the Espionage Act for lobbyists who received infor-
mation they suspected or had reason to suspect was illegally shared by
a government employee.26
Part IV argues that First Amendment scholars and practitioners
may use the expansive definition of what constitutes a matter of public
concern in Snyder v. Phelps to widen the constitutional protection for
politically relevant, unpopular speech. Part V juxtaposes Snyder v.
Phelps with two “War on Terror” cases, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Pro-
ject27 and Weise v. Casper28, and suggests that lower courts are reluctant
to provide robust First Amendment protection for civilian speech di-
rectly dealing with the Iraq or Afghanistan wars—speech that is clearly
a matter of public concern.
Finally, this Comment concludes by advocating for categorical
constitutional protection for publishers of truthful and previously un-
disclosed government information of public importance when the
publisher does nothing illegal, short of publication. If WikiLeaks is
prosecuted for these leaks, the First Amendment should protect it
from liability.
I. The Current Policy Debate Over Whether the Government
Should Be Able to Prosecute the Press
Assuming WikiLeaks is considered a member of the press, does it
offend the First Amendment to allow the government to civilly or
criminally sanction the press for publishing previously undisclosed in-
formation? Historically, the government has more power over the
press during times of war.29 Nonetheless, the underlying rationale,
that in times of war we must temporarily cede constitutional rights,
makes less sense in the current context of the seemingly perpetual
War on Terror.30 If the United States is always at war and this status
justifies censorship, then the public will be ill equipped for their vital
role in our democracy.
26. United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 635–37 (E.D. Va. 2006).
27. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
28. Weise v. Casper, 593 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2010).
29. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“When a nation is at war
many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their
utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as
protected by any constitutional right.”).
30. The Afghan war holds the record as the longest American war. Thomas Nagorski,
Afghan War Now Country’s Longest, ABC NEWS (June 7, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Polit-
ics/afghan-war-now-longest-war-us-history/story?id=10849303.
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WikiLeaks is just the most recent example of the persistent de-
bate between the public’s right to access information and the govern-
ment’s desire for secrecy. For example, the government recently
threatened the New York Times with Espionage Act liability for re-
vealing the National Security Agency’s (“NSA”) domestic wiretapping
program.31 Nonetheless, the New York Times story exposed the practice
to public scrutiny and subsequently subjected it to congressional
oversight.32
On one side of the debate, WikiLeaks argues that the press
should not be punished for making the government more transpar-
ent: “[T]ransparency in government activities leads to reduced cor-
ruption, better government[,] and stronger democracies. All
governments can benefit from increased scrutiny by the world com-
munity, as well as their own people. We believe this scrutiny requires
information.”33 Press freedom provides a valuable check on govern-
ment authority given the press’s outsider status: “When Congress is
controlled by the party of the President and is not providing robust
checks on executive power, the press’s extra-legal and extra-constitu-
tional reporting of questionable but secret government activity pro-
vides an especially important check on presidential overreaching.”34
Moreover, secrecy can be unhealthy in a democracy: “Secrecy in gov-
ernment is fundamentally anti-democratic, perpetuating bureaucratic
errors. Open debate and discussion of public issues are vital to our
national health. On public questions there should be ‘uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open’ debate.”35 The press also plays an important
role in educating voters about the inter-workings of government: “It is
a truism that we cannot responsibly exercise our franchise unless we
have sufficient knowledge about governmental affairs, operations, and
policies to make informed choices . . . .”36 Further, press reporting on
national security information may actually help U.S. security by expos-
ing flaws in the security infrastructure:
31. David Johnston, Inquiry into Wiretapping Article Widens, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2006,
§ 1, at 26.
32. Id.
33. WikiLeaks: About, WIKILEAKS, http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Wikileaks:About (last vis-
ited Jan. 11, 2012); Eric Schmitt, In Disclosing Secret Documents, WikiLeaks Seeks ‘Transparency,’
N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2010, at A11.
34. William H. Freivogel, Publishing National Security Secrets: The Case for “Benign Indeter-
minacy,” 3 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 95, 95 (2009).
35. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 724 (1971) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
36. Lillian R. BeVier, An Informed Public, an Informing Press: The Search for a Constitu-
tional Principle, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 482, 482 (1980).
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Although these disclosures hypothetically notify terrorists of ave-
nues of attack against America, they might also improve national
security by giving notice to the government of any security vulnera-
bilities of which it is not aware so it can take steps to remedy those
weaknesses. Additionally, even if the government is aware of the
vulnerabilities, their exposure may instigate a public outcry, de-
manding that the weaknesses be corrected quickly—resulting in
greater security, faster.37
Even Gabriel Schoenfeld, who publicly advocated for the criminal
prosecution of the New York Times for revealing the Bush administra-
tion’s warrantless wiretapping program, admits there may be some na-
tional benefit to whistleblowers and the publication of leaks: “We all
depend on newspapers and television for information about how we
are being governed. Leaks are part of that daily flow, and we depend
upon leaks. I as a citizen depend upon leaks.”38
On the other hand, there are people who argue that national se-
curity is a government interest of the highest magnitude and some
level of secrecy is necessary. Thus, publishers should be banned from
releasing all undisclosed government documents, even if the release
of this information is unlikely to lead to certain, irreparable harm. For
example, Judge Richard Posner counters:
Secrecy is essential. And it cannot be secured merely by having laws
that forbid the disclosure of classified information. It is too easy for
possessors of such information to leak it without running a signifi-
cant risk of detection. To keep it secret the government must be
able to punish the media when they knowingly publish it.39
Following this logic, Garcetti alone does not adequately protect the
government’s secrets because it is often too difficult to establish a
prima facie case against leakers. Rather, the government should have
the option to criminally or civilly sanction the press for publishing
information found in leaked, previously undisclosed documents.
Additionally, Judge Posner is deeply concerned about the over-
classification of government information:
Government agencies frequently classify material not because it
contains secrets that would endanger the nation if revealed to the
public but because publication would embarrass the agency by re-
vealing its mistakes or would provide helpful information to a rival
agency. Overclassification creates a culture of secrecy that inhibits
37. Judson O. Littleton, Note, Eliminating Public Disclosures of Government Information
from the Reach of the Espionage Act, 86 TEX. L. REV. 889, 910 (2008).
38. Bill Keller, Secrecy in Shreds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2011, at MM11 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
39. RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NA-
TIONAL EMERGENCY 106 (2006).
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the production and flow of information to which the public should
be entitled.40
Representative John Conyers agrees that overclassification is a
problem:
[O]ur problem with our security system, and why Bradley Manning
can get his hands on all these cables, is we got low fences around a
vast prairie because the government classifies just about everything.
What we really need are high fences around a small graveyard of
what is really sensitive. Furthermore, we are too quick to accept
government claims that risk the national security and far too quick
to forget the enormous value of some national security leaks.41
Posner and Conyers, thus, seek a rule that punishes publishers; yet
they concede that not all undisclosed government information poses
the same national security risk. They believe that the goal of trans-
parency is best reached through an improved classification system that
shields the public only from information that is truly damaging. If
such dangerous information is published, they believe the govern-
ment should have recourse to punish the publisher. Nevertheless, as
discussed below, the Court in Bartnicki rejected Posner’s reasoning
that it is acceptable to punish publishers in order to deter and detect
leakers.42
At its core, the policy debate about the classic tension between
transparency and accountability versus safety and security has no clear
answers. One thing is clear, the Framers of the Constitution and the
Supreme Court as its ultimate arbiters would never allow national se-
curity concerns to categorically trump the freedom to publish: “His-
tory teaches us how easily the spectre of a threat to ‘national security’
may be used to justify a wide variety of repressive government
actions.”43
II. Two Methods the Government Might Use to Stop
WikiLeaks (and Other Media) from Publishing Its
Secrets
The United States government has never prosecuted the press for
disclosing government secrets in the nation’s 236 year history. The
only case similar to the WikiLeaks situation was forty-one years ago in
40. Id. at 107.
41. Espionage Act and the Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by WikiLeaks: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2 (2010) [hereinafter Espionage Act Hearing]
(opening statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
42. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529–32 (2001).
43. United States v. Soussoudis (In re Wash. Post Co.), 807 F.2d 383, 391 (4th Cir.
1986).
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New York Times v. United States, the Pentagon Papers case, where the
government tried to enjoin the New York Times and Washington Post
from publishing a leaked, classified report. The case ultimately left
unresolved the issue of whether the government may criminally or
civilly punish the press for publishing classified or previously undis-
closed information.44 Despite this laissez-faire history, given the mag-
nitude of previously undisclosed government information WikiLeaks
released over the past two years, the government is currently explor-
ing the possibility of making WikiLeaks the first publisher to be pun-
ished criminally, civilly, or both.45
There are two primary legal means available to the DOJ to stop
WikiLeaks from publishing previously undisclosed government infor-
mation: (1) invoking a prior restraint to prevent future publications
before they happen; and (2) utilizing the Espionage Act to criminally
sanction the publication after the fact.
A. Prior Restraint
There is a heavy presumption under the First Amendment that
prior restraints are unconstitutional.46 Prior restraints, injunctions en-
joining “harmful” speech, are “the most serious and the least tolerable
infringement of First Amendment rights”47 because they happen
before both the speech and the harm occurs, never giving speakers
the opportunity to express themselves. Moreover, prior restraints are
offensive to personal autonomy, removing the speaker’s choice of
whether or not to publish and deal with the consequences.48
The government may overcome the burden against prior re-
straint only if the government’s interest is of the highest magnitude
and the prior restraint is necessary because the harm is certain and
irreparable, effective in preventing the harm, and alternatives to the
prior restraint do not exist to protect the government’s interest.49 For
example, prior restraints may be issued against the press if they seek
44. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (af-
firming the lower court’s decision that the government failed to meet its heavy burden to
get a prior restraint to prevent the New York Times and the Washington Post from further
publishing the Pentagon Papers).
45. See Savage, supra note 9; Savage, supra note 10. R
46. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (“Any system of prior re-
straints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitu-
tional validity.”).
47. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
48. See FARBER, supra note 19, at 45–48. R
49. See Neb. Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 605, 609.
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to publish the sailing date of troops,50 hydrogen bomb blueprints,51
or trade secrets.52
In New York Times v. United States, Justices Black, Douglas, White,
Marshall, Brennen, and Stewart held in a per curiam opinion that the
government could not enjoin the New York Times and the Washington
Post from publishing the Pentagon Papers report, a classified historical
study on Vietnam policy, leaked by RAND Corporation employee
Daniel Ellsberg.53 Justice Douglas thought that this report was improp-
erly classified as top secret, pointing out that the “[t]he dominant pur-
pose of the First Amendment was to prohibit the widespread practice
of governmental suppression of embarrassing information.”54 Justice
Black also warned against allowing the government unchecked au-
thority to determine what information is too dangerous to enter the
marketplace of ideas: “The word ‘security’ is a broad, vague generality
whose contours should not be invoked to abrogate the fundamental
law embodied in the First Amendment.”55
Despite this heavy government burden, in 2008 a district court
judge issued a temporary restraining order that required Dynadot, an
internet service provider, to stop hosting WikiLeaks.org and
WikiLeaks to stop “publishing, disseminating, or hyperlinking to any
document.”56 Nonetheless, the requested preliminary injunction was
denied after intervention by various pro-First Amendment amici.57
One such group argued:
[T]he right to access the materials posted on the Wiki[L]eaks web-
site is peculiarly deserving of protection under the First Amend-
ment because the materials implicate issues of the utmost
importance, such as international human rights, political corrup-
tion, and other governmental misconduct. As much or more than
50. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
51. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 996 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
52. See Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 226–27 (6th Cir.
1996) (stating in dicta that the court would allow a temporary restraining order (“TRO”), a
specific type of prior restraint, on releasing trade secrets if the elements of Rule 65 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were met).
53. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam); Noam
Cohen, What Would Daniel Ellsberg Do with the Pentagon Papers Today?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19,
2010, at B3.
54. N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 723–24 (Douglas, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 719 (Black, J., concurring).
56. Bank Julius Baer & Co. v. WikiLeaks, No. CV08-0824 JSW, 2008 WL 612072 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 18, 2008); Bank Julius Baer & Co. v. WikiLeaks, 535 F. Supp. 2d 980, 983 (N.D.
Cal. 2008).
57. Bank Julius Baer & Co., 535 F. Supp. 2d at 984–85 (“[I]t is clear that in all but the
most exceptional circumstances, an injunction restricting speech pending final resolution
of the constitutional concerns is impermissible.”).
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any other value, the First Amendment serves the people’s interest
in self-government.58
While TROs are inherently prone to error as they must be decided on
before a judge is fully briefed on the issue, this judge’s initial granting
suggests that there may be some willingness to allow a prior restraint
against WikiLeaks.
Given the New York Times v. United States precedent, a prior re-
straint on WikiLeaks seems unlikely unless they publish something as
egregious as the sailing date of troops.59 Moreover, such an order may
not be feasible to enforce anyway given the construction of the In-
ternet and WikiLeaks’ global scale. According to Julian Assange:
The [United States] does not have the technology to take the site
down. . . . Just the way our technology is constructed, the way the
Internet is constructed. It’s quite hard to stop things from reap-
pearing. . . . [W]e now have some 2,000 fully independent in every
way Web sites, where we’re publishing around the world.60
Since one requirement of a prior restraint is that it would be “effec-
tive” in curing the harm proposed, it is extremely unlikely that a prior
restraint issued against WikiLeaks would be upheld.
B. Espionage Act
As an alternative, the government would likely attempt to use sec-
tions 793 and 798(a) of the Espionage Act to prosecute those who do
not occupy a position of trust with the government, namely the me-
dia.61 Originally passed in 1917 and amended most recently in 1950,
“the Espionage Act is one of the most confusing and ambiguous fed-
eral criminal statutes.”62
Section 793(c) punishes the receipt of documents with knowl-
edge that they have been obtained in violation of other espionage pro-
58. Motion of Public Citizen and California First Amendment Coalition to Intervene
as Defendants or, in the Alternative, to Appear as Amici Curiae at 10, Bank Julius Baer &
Co. v. WikiLeaks, 535 F. Supp. 2d 980 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. CV08-0824 JSW), 2008 WL
538832.
59. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (offering the disclo-
sure of the sailing date of troops as a narrow exception to the general rule against prior
restraints). It is interesting to consider if this exception still holds given developments in
the speed of communications and transportation since 1931, allowing military generals to
make quick tactical changes if this sensitive information were to be disclosed to the public.
60. 60 Minutes: WikiLeaks’ Julian Assange (CBS television broadcast Jan. 30, 2011),
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7300034n; Julian Assange, The Man
Behind WikiLeaks, CBSNEWS (Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/2102-18560_162-728
6686.html?tag=contentMain;contentBody.
61. 18 U.S.C. §§ 793, 798 (2006).
62. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and National
Security Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233, 263 (2008).
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visions.63 Section 793(d) punishes the communication to
unauthorized individuals of information related to national defense
by individuals who are authorized to have the information.64 This sec-
tion targets government employees turned whistleblowers. On the
other hand, section 793(e) punishes the communication, dissemina-
tion, or retention of such information by an individual not authorized
to have it.65 This section does not explicitly prohibit publishing; how-
ever, it is this sub-section of 793 that is most likely to affect third party
publishers. Moreover, section 798 punishes the knowing and willful
disclosure of classified “communication intelligence” that is prejudi-
cial to the safety or interests of the United States or for the benefit of
any foreign government.66
Scholars generally agree that facially, sections 793(e) and 798(a)
have the potential to apply to media outlets that obtain, retain, or pub-
lish national defense information.67 However, Harold Edgar and
Benno Schmidt assert that “the legislative record is reasonably clear
that a broad literal reading was not intended” given Congress’ deci-
sion to not include a proposed provision that would have given the
Executive the power to censor the press.68 Similarly, Benjamin S.
Duval concluded that the “Espionage Act is of uncertain applicability
against disclosures made for the purpose of public debate.”69 Addi-
tionally, Judge Ellis in Rosen held that the Espionage Act includes a
scienter requirement that would be difficult to prove against people
who disseminate information.70 Under this scienter requirement, the
government must show that defendants willfully communicated the
information and had a “bad faith purpose to either harm the United
States or to aid a foreign government.”71 Since a key function of the
press is to disseminate information to the public in good faith, it
63. § 793(c).
64. § 793(d); see United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1070 (4th Cir. 1988) (hold-
ing a government employee, who also happened to work for the press, liable under
§ 793(d) for transmitting confidential government information to a newspaper).
65. § 793(e).
66. § 798.
67. See generally Espionage Act Hearing, supra note 41 (advising Congress on the affects R
of the SHIELD Act, S. 4004, 111th Cong. (2010) and the constitutional and political pro-
grams associated with applying the Espionage Act, in either current or amended form, to
the news media).
68. Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage Statutes and Publication of
Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 1000 (1973).
69. Benjamin S. DuVal, Jr., The Occasions of Secrecy, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 579, 673 (1986).
70. See United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 625–26 (E.D. Va. 2006).
71. Id.
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would be difficult for the government to effectively use the Espionage
Act against the press.
In one of the few cases on point, New York Times v. United States,
three Supreme Court justices in the majority—Justices White, Stewart,
and Marshall—each suggested in concurring opinions that the Espio-
nage Act could be used to criminally prosecute publishers.72 Before
discussing the various provisions of the Espionage Act, Justice White
pointed out: “[F]ailure by the Government to justify prior restraints
does not measure its constitutional entitlement to a conviction for
criminal publication. . . . The Criminal Code contains numerous pro-
visions potentially relevant to these cases.”73 While the Court left the
door open for the government to prosecute the press for disseminat-
ing government secrets under the Espionage Act, it has not yet been
employed for this purpose. Nonetheless, if the government chooses to
pursue legal action against WikiLeaks, it will likely rely on the above-
mentioned sections of the Espionage Act.
In an effort to amend the law to expressly enable the government
to prosecute WikiLeaks for future publications of previously undis-
closed government information, Senators John Ensign, Joseph Lieber-
man, and Scott Brown introduced the SHIELD Act (Securing Human
Intelligence and Enforcing Lawful Dissemination) in February 2011.74
The SHIELD Act would amend § 798 of the Espionage Act to also
make it illegal to publish information “concerning the human intelli-
gence activities of the United States or any foreign government” and
“concerning the identity of a classified source or informant of an ele-
ment of the intelligence community of the United States.”75 Such an
72. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 734 (1971) (White & Stewart, JJ.,
concurring) (“Congress appeared to have little doubt that newspapers would be subject to
criminal prosecution if they insisted on publishing information of the type Congress had
itself determined should not be revealed.”); id. at 743 (Marshall, J., concurring) (Congress
enacted the Espionage Act to protect national security and make it a “crime to receive,
disclose, communicate, withhold, and publish certain documents, photographs, instru-
ments, appliances, and information.”).
73. Id. at 733–35 (White & Stewart, JJ., concurring).
74. SHIELD Act, S. 315, 112th Cong. (2011). S. 315 has been read twice and referred
to the Senate Judiciary Committee. See Bill Summary & Status—112th Congress
(2011–2012)—S. 315, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:s.00315:
(last visited Jan. 18, 2012). The House version of the SHIELD Act, H.R. 703, 112th Cong.
(2011), was referred to the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security
and has ten co-sponsors. Bill Summary & Status—112th Congress (2011–2012)—H.R. 703,
THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:HR00703: (last visited Jan. 18,
2012). A previous version of the SHIELD Act was introduced in December 2010. S. 4004,
111th Cong. (2010); H.R. 6506, 111th Cong. (2010).
75. S. 315, § 2(a).
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amendment would broaden the scope of the ninety-five year old Espi-
onage Act to directly and explicitly target publishers and journalists. It
will be interesting to see if this bill survives committee.
III. Does the Daily Mail Principle Protect WikiLeaks from
Liability when it Knowingly Receives and Publishes
Illegally-Obtained Information About a Matter
of Public Concern?
The Daily Mail principle—the idea that publishers who knowingly
receive and publish information on a matter of public concern that
was illegally obtained by a third party is protected under the First
Amendment—developed over a series of cases, starting with Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia76 and was most recently refined in Bart-
nicki v. Vopper.77
The First Amendment is a patchwork of two primary modes of
analysis, the (1) balancing approach and (2) the categorical
approach:
Generally, balancing approaches set the individual’s interest in as-
serting a right against the government’s interest in regulating it,
attach whatever weights are appropriate for the context, and deter-
mine which is weightier. In contrast, categoricalism prohibits this
kind of weighing of interests in the individual case and asks only
whether the case falls inside certain predetermined, outcome-de-
terminative lines.78
The categorical approach allows for both categorical inclusion and
categorical exclusion. For example, child pornography is categorically
excluded from First Amendment protection;79 whereas, this Comment
argues that publication on matters of public concern should be cate-
gorically protected.
Whether the Daily Mail principle protects WikiLeaks against lia-
bility depends on if: (1) the information published by WikiLeaks is
regarding a matter of public concern; (2) WikiLeaks did not actively
participate in unlawful conduct other than the information’s ultimate
publication; and (3) Bartnicki applies to the government’s right to
keep all undisclosed information secret, instead of just the right to
individual privacy.
76. Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
77. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
78. Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 381–98 (2009).
79. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763–74 (holding child pornography a category
of material outside the protection of the First Amendment).
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Courts recognize that “speech on ‘matters of public concern’ . . .
is ‘at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection.’”80 The Daily
Mail principle shields the media from liability for knowingly publish-
ing truthful information that was illegally obtained by a third party
when that information is about a matter of public concern.81 Never-
theless, scholars disagree about the meaning and scope of the princi-
ple since the Bartnicki is a plurality opinion, with Justices Breyer and
O’Connor writing a separate concurrence using different reasoning to
reach the same outcome. Richard D. Shoop fears that “Bartnicki’s ulti-
mate usefulness is limited because the vagueness of the holding invites
future challenges likely to result in an even more restricted hold-
ing.”82 However, others recognize that Bartnicki is clear that “when the
press induces sources to disclose what they know about newsworthy
matters, it is protected by the First Amendment when it proceeds to
publish such information, regardless of the legality of its source’s
actions.”83
Nonetheless, the Daily Mail line of cases largely involves privacy
interests. The law is unclear whether a robust constitutional protec-
tion for speech about public issues would extend to speech about pre-
viously undisclosed government information that touches on national
security, a government interest of the highest order. This ambiguity in
the law arguably gives the press greater latitude to report on impor-
tant national security stories such as the Bush administration’s war-
rantless wiretapping and extraordinary rendition programs.84 William
H. Freivogel warns that media lawyers should be cautious in this un-
certain area of First Amendment law or risk the courts adopting clear
rules that are hostile to the press:
[T]he press—and by extension the public—is better served by a
continuation of the state of uncertainty than by bright-line rules.
Recent attempts by the press to argue in favor of an extravagant
reporter’s privilege have backfired, partly because of unfavorable
facts and partly because media lawyers have overstated the law.85
80. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–59 (1985)
(quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)).
81. See infra Part III.A.
82. Richard D. Shoop, Recent Case, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001), 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 449, 465 (2002).
83. Lee Levine et al., Handcuffing the Press: First Amendment Limitations on the Reach of
Criminal Statutes as Applied to the Media, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1015, 1026 (2010–2011).
84. See, e.g., Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations:
‘Stress and Duress’ Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities, WASH.
POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at A01; James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers
Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.
85. Freivogel, supra note 34, at 97. R
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Alternatively, the government may decide not to prosecute pub-
lishers out of fear that such a case may present the opportunity for the
Court to utilize the Daily Mail principle to explicitly provide the press
with the heightened First Amendment protection that this Comment
argues may exist, emboldening reporters to publish stories vital to our
democracy without fear of prosecution. It remains to be seen if
WikiLeaks will be the test case to break this stalemate.
A. The Creation of the Daily Mail Principle
Historically, in order to determine if the speech was constitution-
ally protected, courts used a balancing test, weighing the First Amend-
ment interests against the plaintiff’s personal privacy interest. In
Bartnicki and the Daily Mail line of cases, a majority of the Justices
moved closer to embracing categorical protection for truthful publica-
tion on matters of a public concern. The following section explains
this development.
1. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia
In Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, a local newspaper
published a story accurately revealing that the Virginia Judicial In-
quiry and Review Commission was investigating a particular judge for
possible ethics violations.86 The newspaper was prosecuted under a
Virginia statute that made disclosure of such confidential investiga-
tions a misdemeanor.87 The Supreme Court refused to adopt an abso-
lute categorical protection from liability for all truthful information of
public concern, but instead held that the “government may not pro-
hibit or punish the publication of that information once it falls into
the hands of the press, unless the need for secrecy is manifestly over-
whelming.”88 Thus, in Landmark the Court made clear the presump-
tion that the press should not be prosecuted for publishing accurate
information it receives, allowing the government to rebut in cases
where the need for secrecy is overwhelming.
2. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.
In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., when a fifteen-year old stu-
dent was shot and killed at the local junior high school, reporters went
to the scene after hearing reports of the crime on police scanners.89
86. Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 831–32 (1978).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 849 (Stewart, J., concurring).
89. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 99 (1979).
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They learned the suspect’s name through traditional newsgathering
techniques (i.e., not directly from the government) by interviewing
the witnesses, the police, and the assistant prosecuting attorney at the
scene.90 A West Virginia statute punished publication of juveniles’
names without court permission as a misdemeanor.91 The Daily Mail
newspaper published an initial story about the events, but knowing
that such publication would be illegal decided to omit the minor’s
name; however, a competing paper published the minor’s name, as
did local radio stations.92 Subsequently, the Daily Mail decided to pub-
lish another story, this time including the minor’s name.93 The Daily
Mail was soon after indicted under the statute.94
The Supreme Court articulated the following basic rule: “[I]f a
newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of
public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish
publication of the information, absent a need to further a state inter-
est of the highest order.”95 In analyzing the case, the Court did not
specify what level of scrutiny it was applying; however, the opinion
uses the language of heightened scrutiny, either intermediate or
strict. For example, the Court found that punishing publishers was
not “necessary” to achieve the government’s interest in keeping the
name of juveniles accused of a crime confidential in order to further
their rehabilitation.96 Moreover, the means of accomplishing this goal
was underinclusive: “The statute does not restrict the electronic media
or any form of publication, except ‘newspapers,’ from printing the
names of youths charged in a juvenile proceeding.”97 Therefore, the
statute banning publication of such names was unconstitutional.98
The Court described this holding as “narrow” and noted that the issue
is “simply the power of a state to punish the truthful publication of an
alleged juvenile delinquent’s name lawfully obtained by a
newspaper.”99
Adding to the presumption established in Landmark, the Su-
preme Court’s balancing/tiers of scrutiny approach in Daily Mail ap-
90. Id.
91. Id. at 98–99.
92. Id. at 99.
93. Id. at 100.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 103.
96. Id. at 104–05.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 106.
99. Id. at 105–06.
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plied heightened scrutiny when the government sought to prosecute
the press for publishing accurate information. The case also clarified
that the government interest in protecting the anonymity of juvenile
offenders did not outweigh the freedom of the press.
3. Florida Star v. B.J.F.
In Florida Star v. B.J.F., a Florida statute punished the publication
of rape victims’ names.100 A Florida Star newspaper reporter-trainee
obtained a rape victim’s name from a publicly available police report,
and the newspaper published a story about the incident including
B.J.F.’s full name.101 Whereas in Daily Mail it was unclear if the Court
was applying intermediate or strict scrutiny, the Court in Florida Star
more clearly applied strict scrutiny, noting that keeping rape victims’
names out of the press “further[s] a state interest of the highest or-
der” but finding problems with the means employed for not being
sufficiently narrowly tailored.102 The Supreme Court held, “[w]here a
newspaper publishes truthful information, which it has lawfully ob-
tained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when nar-
rowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order.”103
Key for the Court was “B.J.F.’s identity would never have come to
light were it not for the erroneous, if inadvertent, inclusion by the
Department of her full name in an incident report made available in a
pressroom open to the public.”104 It seemed unfair to punish the me-
dia for the government’s oversight.105 Instead of prosecuting the me-
dia for publication, the Court noted that the government is better
suited to bear the burden of better protecting its sensitive information
from being made public in the first instance.106
The statute at issue in the case was especially troubling and, ulti-
mately underinclusive, because it only applied to an “instrument of
mass communication.”107 Local town gossip, which could be equally
damaging to juvenile offenders, was not covered by the statute.108
Moreover, the Court wanted to avoid any chilling effect caused by
100. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 526 (1989).
101. Id. at 527.
102. Id. at 537–38.
103. Id. at 541.
104. Id. at 538.
105. See id. at 525.
106. See id. at 534 (describing how the government has ample means to safeguard sensi-
tive information that are less drastic than punishing truthful publication).
107. Id. at 540.
108. Id.
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punishing the press for publishing information found in an official
news release.109 Nonetheless, while adding the requirement of narrow
tailoring in order to provide added protections for publishers, the
Court did not reach the issue whether “truthful publication may never
be punished consistent with the First Amendment.”110 In developing
the Daily Mail principle, Florida Star is most important as signaling that
the principle was not anomalous and could be extended beyond the
facts of the Daily Mail case.
4. Bartnicki v. Vopper
The most recent decision clarifying and expanding the Daily Mail
principle is Bartnicki v. Vopper.111 Bartnicki expanded the Daily Mail
principle by applying its protection of publishers to cases where the
information at issue was obtained by the publisher’s source illegally.
In Bartnicki, an unknown person illegally intercepted a cellular phone
conversation between Bartnicki, a teacher’s union negotiator, and
Kane, the union’s president about a heated collective bargaining ne-
gotiation.112 At one point during the conversation, Kane said: “If
they’re not gonna move for three percent, we’re gonna have to go to
their, their homes . . . . To blow off their front porches, we’ll have to
do some work on some of those guys.”113 The interceptor anony-
mously left a tape of the conversation in the mailbox of Yocum, the
head of the local taxpayers’ organization who had opposed the
union’s demands throughout the negotiations.114 Yocum then sent
the tape to Vopper, a radio commentator critical of the teachers’
union, and Vopper played the private conversation on the radio.115
The plurality in Bartnicki explicitly rejected categorically protect-
ing all truthful speech on matters of public concern: “Our refusal to
construe the issue presented more broadly is consistent with this
Court’s repeated refusal to answer categorically whether truthful pub-
lication may ever be punished consistent with the First Amend-
ment.”116 Nevertheless, in practice, this is precisely what the Court in
Bartnicki actually does. Bartnicki is distinguishable from the previous
109. See id. at 535–36 (discussing the “timidity and self-censorship” which may result
from allowing media to be punished for publishing certain truthful information).
110. Id. at 532.
111. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
112. Id. at 517–18.
113. Id. at 518–19 (alteration in original).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 529.
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Daily Mail line of cases in that (1) the Court does not utilize the lan-
guage that animates the traditional tiers of scrutiny analysis; and (2)
puts a thumb on the scale in favor of speech about a matter of public
concern117—both of which move the court closer to the categorical
approach.
Ultimately, Bartnicki holds that the media should be constitution-
ally protected for publishing truthful information about a matter of
public concern if the media did not participate in unlawfully acquir-
ing the information, even if they knew it was illegally obtained.118 Es-
sentially, “a stranger’s illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the
First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public con-
cern.”119 The plurality recognized that “there are important interests
to be considered on both sides of the constitutional calculus.”120 While
the plurality states that “privacy concerns give way when balanced
against the interest in publishing matters of public importance,”121
the opinion may be read as not using the balancing approach at all,
but rather a categorical approach.
In arriving at its holding, the Court never actually balanced any-
thing since it easily rejected both of the government’s proposed com-
pelling interests in punishing publishers. The first government
interest was removing the incentive to tap.122 The Court quickly re-
jected this argument, noting, “it would be quite remarkable to hold
that speech by a law-abiding possessor of information can be sup-
pressed in order to deter conduct by a non-law-abiding third party.”123
Further, the Court suggested that the government must offer empiri-
cal evidence and not mere speculation that punishing publishers has
any deterrent effect on actual interceptors.124
Second, the government argued that it was necessary to punish
publishers in order to reduce harm to private speakers.125 Justice
Rehnquist and the dissenters found this argument compelling, argu-
ing that the plurality’s decision “diminishes, rather than enhances, the
purposes of the First Amendment, thereby chilling the speech of the
millions of Americans who rely upon electronic technology to com-
117. See id. at 534.
118. Id. at 528, 534–35.
119. Id. at 535.
120. Id. at 533.
121. Id. at 534.
122. Id. at 529.
123. Id. at 529–30.
124. Id. at 530–31.
125. See id. at 532–33.
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municate each day.”126 The plurality, however, rejects this argument
without substantive discussion.127 Justices Breyer, in his concurrence
with whom Justice O’Connor joins, gives more weight to the impor-
tance of protecting people’s privacy but nevertheless concludes that
the statutes here are overbroad.128
The plurality opinion also points to the precedent like New York
Times v. Sullivan and many others that “relied on our ‘profound na-
tional commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’”129 Furthermore, the
Court recognized the possibility of a chilling effect if the law allowed
punishment for publication of truthful information.130
Importantly, the Court also states, “we draw no distinction be-
tween the media respondents and Yocum.”131 Thus, Barnicki applies
beyond the press to all who innocently receive illegally obtained infor-
mation and share it with others. As a result, this protection would ap-
ply to WikiLeaks even if the government can somehow distinguish it
from traditional media.
Justices Breyer and O’Connor’s concurrence appears to narrow
the holding of Bartnicki. Breyer and O’Connor signed onto the opin-
ion since Vopper “acted lawfully (up to the time of final public disclo-
sure)” and the conversation contained “a threat of potential physical
harm to others.”132 The concurrence also points out that Bartnicki
126. Id. at 542 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
127. See id. at 529 (plurality opinion) (“The Government identifies . . . the interest
minimizing the harm to persons whose conversations have been illegally intercepted. We
assume that . . . interest[ ] adequately justif[ies] the prohibition . . . against the intercep-
tor’s own use[,] . . . but it by no means follows that punishing disclosures of lawfully ob-
tained information of public interest by one not involved in the initial illegality is an
acceptable means of serving those ends.”).
128. See id. at 538 (Breyer & O’Connor, JJ., concurring) (“[T]he statutes, as applied in
these circumstances, do not reasonably reconcile the competing constitutional objectives.
Rather, they disproportionately interfere with media freedom.”).
129. Id. at 534 (plurality opinion) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
270 (1964)); The Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, an unsuccessful defamation case
brought by a public figure against the New York Times for an editorial advertisement that
suggested the plaintiff’s police force engaged in racially-motivated arrests and suppression
of student groups during the Civil Rights Movement, noted that “we consider this case
against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials.” N.Y. Times Co., 375 U.S. at 256–61, 270.
130. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 535 n.22 (citing Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 535
(1989)).
131. Id. at 525 n.8.
132. Id. at 535–36 (Breyer & O’Connor, JJ., concurring).
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and Kane had a low interest in privacy since they were limited purpose
public figures on the topic of the negotiations.133 The concurrence
would appear to allow statutes restricting media freedom, providing
the laws are narrowly tailored “in order [to] reasonably . . . reconcile
media freedom with personal, speech-related privacy.”134 Nonetheless,
the Justices find that the balance struck in this particular statute “dis-
proportionately interfere[s] with media freedom” because it punishes
publishers who “engaged in no unlawful activity other than the ulti-
mate publication of the information another had previously ob-
tained.”135 Justices Breyer and O’Connor’s stated goal was to keep the
constitutional holding narrow to allow legislatures flexibility in the
future.136
While Breyer and O’Connor revert to the more traditional bal-
ancing approach, their ultimate conclusion—that publishers should
be protected by the First Amendment if they engage in completely
lawful conduct other than the ultimate publication of sensitive mate-
rial137—is not that different from the plurality opinion. Under both
approaches, any attempt by the government to prosecute WikiLeaks
under the Espionage Act for releasing material that solely implicated
issues of personal privacy would be unlawful. It is less clear that this
rule may be stretched to also encompass publication of previously un-
disclosed government information that may involve issues of national
security.
On the other hand, Daniel P. Paradis argues the concurrence ad-
vocates a totality of the circumstances test, which may provide even
broader protection for publishers who obtained the information
illegally:
Under Justice Breyer’s approach, it seems that the media’s involve-
ment, or lack thereof, in the illegal interception might not be dis-
positive in defeating a First Amendment defense, as it is in Justice
Steven’s framework. For example, direct illegal interception by the
media could perhaps be outweighed by the fact that the contents
133. Id. at 539–40 (“[T]he speakers themselves, the president of a teacher’s union and
the union’s chief negotiator, were ‘limited public figures,’ for they voluntarily engaged in a
public controversy. They thereby subjected themselves to somewhat greater public scrutiny
and had a lesser interest in privacy than an individual engaged in purely private affairs.”).
134. Id. at 538.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 541 (“[W]e should avoid adopting overly broad or rigid constitutional
rules, which would unnecessarily restrict legislative flexibility.”).
137. Id. at 536–38.
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of the communication reveal egregious acts or plots by “all-pur-
pose” public figures (e.g., congressmen).138
Paradis’ analysis seems to be stretching the text. Further, this analysis
is not necessary in order to protect WikiLeaks because the organiza-
tion did nothing illegal short of publication—it is no different than
Vopper in Bartnicki, a passive recipient of information. Nevertheless,
even if Paradis’ analysis is correct, the approach suggested by the plu-
rality opinion would provide superior protection to publishers, provid-
ing they have clean hands regarding the process of obtaining the
information. The plurality opinion provides heightened First Amend-
ment protection for publication of speech that is a matter of public
concern when the publisher acted lawfully, except for the ultimate
publication.
WikiLeaks thus should receive maximum First Amendment pro-
tection allowed under Bartnicki for publishing the Iraq War Logs, Af-
ghan War Diaries, and Guantanamo Bay prisoner dossiers (providing
WikiLeaks or Assange did not actively participate in seeking out this
information, for example, by hacking into secure government web-
sites). Even though this information arguably hindered diplomatic re-
lations between the United States and its allies,139 it has been vital to
the global press as source material, as a check on military mistakes,
providing the world with a more accurate death toll, and overall in-
forming American citizens as they decide on the future of the United
States’ involvement in the War on Terror.
The cables also show that the U.S. government tends to over-clas-
sify information (including cables that are merely embarrassing or
summarize press reports)140—another topic that is a subject of legiti-
mate news interest. Representative William Delahunt stated that too
much secrecy and overclassification within the executive branch “puts
American democracy at risk.”141 Further, with each release, WikiLeaks
and its media partners are taking additional precautionary steps to
comb through the information and remove anything that may pose
138. Daniel P. Paradis, Comment, Bartnicki v. Vopper: Cell Phones and Throwing Stones,
37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1117, 1141–43 (2003).
139. Daniel Markey et al., Will WikiLeaks Hobble U.S. Diplomacy?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL. (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.cfr.org/diplomacy/wikileaks-hobble-us-diplomacy/
p23526.
140. See, e.g., U.S., Canada Are Close Allies, That’s Classified?, BOS. HERALD (Dec. 9, 2010),
http://www.bostonherald.com/news/us_politics/view.bg?articleid=1301960&format=&
page=2&listingType=politics.
141. Espionage Act Hearing, supra note 41, at 4 (statement of Rep. William Delahunt). R
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serious and irreparable harm, like names of informants, before
publishing.142
The Guantanamo Bay release consisted of intelligence summaries
of approximately 765 prisoners written between 2002 and 2008.143
These assessments also included the identities and photographs of the
majority of the 172 prisoners still being held at the prison and the 201
prisoners released between 2002 and 2004.144 Overall, knowing who is
being detained and the reasons for their detention is of great political
and social value as the American public begins to weigh in on issues,
such as the United States holding detainees outside the jurisdiction of
Article III courts, how it has been handling prisoner interrogations,
and its use of indefinite detention.
B. Challenges to the Daily Mail Principle’s Protection of
Publishers
In the past ten years, two lower court cases have exhibited some
pushback on the Daily Mail principle. In Peavy v. WFAA-TV, the Fifth
Circuit refused to apply the Daily Mail principle because the defen-
dant journalist assisted a source in illegally intercepting phone conver-
sations.145 Since his involvement was greater than being a passive
recipient, his actions were outside the scope of heightened First
Amendment protection.146 In United States v. Rosen, the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia did not use the Daily Mail principle as a defense to
Espionage Act liability for lobbyists who knowingly received classified
information from a government employee.147 This pushback suggests
that if a categorical approach is to be embraced, it will necessarily be
narrow in scope. Of the two cases, the court’s logic in Rosen is more
problematic for WikiLeaks because the case covered the same conduct
as the Daily Mail line of cases (passive receipt of undisclosed informa-
tion) but with two differences: (1) the content involved sensitive and
142. See Charlie Savage, For Attorney General, New Congress Means New Headaches, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 31, 2010, at A12 (“While WikiLeaks was criticized for publishing a cache of
Afghanistan war documents without redacting some details about informers, it has since
been more cautious. Of a cache of more than 250,000 State Department cables, it has so
far published fewer than 2,000, many of which were selected and redacted by a consortium
of newspapers, including The [New York] Times.”).
143. Guantanamo Files, supra note 4. R
144. Id.
145. Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158, 188–90 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[N]one of the
considerations underlying the Court’s application of the Daily Mail principle in Florida Star
are present here.”).
146. Id.
147. United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 607–09 (E.D. Va. 2006).
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undisclosed government information instead of private, civilian con-
versations; and (2) the case involves lobbyists instead of journalists.
However, at the end of the day, Rosen is not controlling precedent for
WikiLeaks.
1. Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc.
In Peavy v. WFAA-TV, the Harmans listened to and recorded their
neighbor’s cordless telephone conversations, believing the conversa-
tions included threats to their safety and evidence of corruption.148
Carver Dan Peavy, the Harmans’ neighbor, was a trustee of the Dallas
Independent School District who “controlled purchases of insurance
for [the school district’s] employees.”149 The Harmans contacted
news station WFAA-TV about their recordings and was put into con-
tact with Robert Riggs, a WFAA investigative journalist.150 Riggs then
proceeded to teach the Harmans how to make additional record-
ings.151 The station’s outside legal counsel informed WFAA that re-
cording the Peavy’s conversations was illegal.152 Nonetheless, while
Riggs did not play these recordings during his news broadcast, he dis-
closed information gained from them in his report.153
The Fifth Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny after distinguish-
ing the case from the Daily Mail line of cases based on the journalist’s
participation in the interception and the statute’s content-neutral ban
on all illegally intercepted communications.154 The court applied in-
termediate scrutiny because the statutes did not “burden substantially
more speech than is necessary to further governmental interests in
protecting the privacy of communications.”155 Also, the court found
that the wiretapping statute had merely an incidental effect on
speech.156
The Supreme Court did not grant certiorari to clarify the level of
scrutiny that should be applied in such a case. Thus, Peavy suggests
that a publisher’s participation in illegally acquiring the information
148. Peavy, 221 F.3d at 164.
149. Id. at 163–64.
150. Id. at 164.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 166.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 181, 190–91 (“[I]t being undisputed that defendants . . . did participate to
some extent concerning the interceptions, . . . it is quite questionable . . . that defendants
‘lawfully received’ the intercepted contents.”).
155. Id. at 192.
156. Id. at 191.
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may be fatal for categorical inclusion for all speech on a “matter of
public concern.”157 Rather, assuming intermediate scrutiny applies,
the law is significantly less speech-protective. Yet, this case is distin-
guishable from the WikiLeaks situation because WikiLeaks is not ad-
vising its sources on how to obtain the information that is ultimately
uploaded to the WikiLeaks website. As argued in infra Part III.C,
WikiLeaks is a more passive recipient much like Vopper in Bartnicki.
2. United States v. Rosen
In United States v. Rosen, two American Israel Public Affairs Com-
mittee lobbyists, Rosen and Weissman, were accused of violating the
Espionage Act by receiving information from Department of Defense
employee Lawrence Franklin, who held top-secret security clearance
and was passing classified information to Israel and various journal-
ists.158 Eventually, the Federal Bureau of Investigation realized Frank-
lin was illegally sharing national defense information.159 To mitigate
his sentence, Franklin agreed to cooperate in the investigation of Ro-
sen and Weissman.160
In the ensuing criminal prosecution under the Espionage Act,
Rosen and Weissman defended by challenging the Espionage Act’s
constitutionality. Rosen and Weissman argued the phrases “informa-
tion relating to the national defense” and “individuals ‘not entitled to
receive’ the information” are unconstitutionally vague.161 The court
held that “information related to the national defense” is not vague
because it requires two elements: (1) the information must be a
closely guarded government secret; and (2) is the type of information
that, if disclosed, must have the potential to threaten U.S. national
security.162 Likewise, the court held that the phrase “individuals ‘not
entitled to receive’ that information” is also not vague.163 Moreover,
although Rosen and Weissman were not government employees and
thus unaware of the classification definitions, the Espionage Act is
157. The Peavy court does not reach the issue of whether the information was a matter
of public concern. Instead, the court focused on how the Daily Mail principle does not
apply when the person claiming its protections participated in the illegal act. Id. at 190.
Prior to this case, this rule only appeared in dicta of Bartnicki. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200
F.3d 109, 117 (3d Cir. 1999).
158. United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 607–09 (E.D. Va. 2006).
159. Id. at 609–10.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 617.
162. Id. at 617, 622 (“[B]oth phrases pass Fifth Amendment muster; they are not un-
constitutionally vague as applied to these defendants.”).
163. Id. at 627.
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saved by two scienter requirements that judges have read into the stat-
ute.164 The government must first prove that the defendant willfully
committed the prohibited conduct (i.e., had a bad intent) and, sec-
ond, that the defendant had a reason to believe that disclosing the
national defense information would harm the United States or aid a
foreign government.165 Thus, if people are truly ignorant, they cannot
be prosecuted under the Espionage Act. This holding suggests that
section 793 the Espionage Act would likely withstand a vagueness chal-
lenge if brought by WikiLeaks, despite the Act’s sweeping language.
Rosen and Weissman also argued that the Espionage Act violates
the First Amendment. The government argued that the Espionage Act
is not constrained by the First Amendment because national security is
the most compelling government interest.166 The court refused to go
so far in limiting the scope of the First Amendment, noting the “con-
duct at issue—collecting information about United States’ foreign
policy and discussing that information with government officials (both
United States and foreign), journalists, and other participants in the
foreign policy establishment—is at the core of the First Amendment’s
guarantees.”167 On the other hand, the court also did not apply the
Daily Mail principle. Instead, the court adopted a totality of the cir-
cumstances test when balancing national security and the First
Amendment.168 Ultimately, because Rosen and Weissman disclosed
classified national defense information the court held that “common
sense and the relevant precedent point persuasively to the conclusion
that the government can punish those outside of the government for
the unauthorized receipt and deliberate retransmission of informa-
tion relating to the national defense.”169 The precedent cited was lan-
guage from the Pentagon Papers case discussed above.170
If the Supreme Court is increasingly embracing a categorical in-
clusion for those who passively receive and publish previously undis-
closed government information that was illegally obtained (as this
Comment argues), and there is no strong basis for distinguishing be-
tween sensitive private information and government information
when both are a matter of public concern, then Rosen was wrongly
decided. Joe Bant points out that the Rosen decision “demonstrates
164. See id. at 625–27.
165. Id. at 625–26.
166. See id. at 629–30, 633–34.
167. Id. at 630.
168. Id. at 632.
169. Id. at 637.
170. See id. at 637–38.
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the courts’ willingness to enforce the Act against ‘those not in a posi-
tion of trust with the government.’”171 Bant continues, “[o]pening up
the door for Espionage Act prosecutions of nongovernment officials
effectively opens the door for using the Act to go after members of the
media.”172 Interestingly, on May 1, 2009 the government filed a mo-
tion to dismiss the indictment against Rosen and Weissman stating,
“we have re-evaluated the case based on the present context and cir-
cumstances, and determined that it is in the public interest to dismiss
the pending superseding indictment.”173 Given this reevaluation, the
decision was not exposed to appellate scrutiny.
C. Despite the Recent Pushback on the Daily Mail Principle, Does
Bartnicki Protect WikiLeaks from Civil or Criminal
Liability?
As stated above, the answer to whether WikiLeaks is covered by
Bartnicki depends on three things, if: (1) the information published by
WikiLeaks is regarding a matter of public concern; (2) WikiLeaks did
not actively participate in unlawful conduct other than the informa-
tion’s ultimate publication; and (3) Bartnicki applies to the govern-
ment’s right to keep all of its undisclosed information secret, instead
of just the right to individual privacy. WikiLeaks meets the first two
tests, and the third is yet to be decided.
For the reasons stated above, the Afghan War Diaries, Iraq War
Logs, and Guantanamo prisoner dossiers contain information that is a
matter of public concern. Regarding how WikiLeaks obtained this ma-
terial, it seems unlikely that the government will be able to show that
WikiLeaks actively participated in illegally obtaining the leaked infor-
mation. Assange recently stated: “We’ve actually played inside the
rules. We didn’t go out and get the materials. We operated just like
any U.S. publisher operated.”174 This statement suggests that
WikiLeaks did not reach out to particular sources and ask them to
illegally obtain information. Nevertheless, the government will likely
argue that WikiLeaks, by virtue of providing and promoting its anony-
171. Joe Bant, Comment, United States v. Rosen: Pushing the Free Press onto a Slippery
Slope?, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1027, 1028 (2007).
172. Id. at 1035.
173. Motion to Dismiss Superseding Indictment at 2, United States v. Rosen, 455 F.
Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2009) (No. 1:05CR225), 2009 WL 1162779.
174. Julian Assange, The Man Behind WikiLeaks, supra note 60. R
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mous uploading technology,175 facilitated the illegal transmission of
previously undisclosed government information, thus making
WikiLeaks and Assange accomplices. The Internet makes it fast and
easy for modern leakers to transmit government information to a
global audience; Daniel Ellsberg by contrast photocopied by hand the
7000-page classified Pentagon Papers report.176 Ultimately, under
Bartnicki whether some form of aider and abettor liability will succeed
depends on whether providing the WikiLeaks website and guaranteed
anonymity is active or passive. WikiLeaks would argue that providing a
website that promises confidentiality is no different from Yocum or
Vopper’s mailbox in Bartnicki.
Judge Posner takes the opposite position, arguing that Barnicki
provides no assistance to journalists who receive and publish classified
information illegally obtained by a third party.177 In Posner’s view,
such publishers are not protected by Bartnicki because “an accomplice
is not ‘law-abiding.’”178 Applying Judge Posner’s understanding, to be
protected by Bartnicki the publisher must have done nothing illegal
short of publication. The government employee who leaked the gov-
ernment cables clearly acted illegally in transmitting the information.
According to Posner, WikiLeaks is an accomplice to the government
employee’s crime by facilitating this transmission. Thus, WikiLeaks is
an accomplice to a crime and not covered by Bartnicki. However,
Judge Posner’s assertion would rewrite the holding of Bartnicki179 and
is unlikely to prevail.
IV. Snyder v. Phelps Strengthens the Concept of Categorical
Inclusion Suggested by Bartnicki for Matters of
Public Concern
Snyder v. Phelps, protecting the “outrageous” speech of the
Westboro Baptist Church (“WBC”),180 is among the most controver-
175. See, e.g., Submissions, WIKILEAKS, http://www.wikileaks.org/Submissions.html (last
visited Jan. 31, 2012). WikiLeaks informs potential information submitters that “[o]ur drop
box is easy to use and provides military-grade encryption protection.” Id.
176. The Most Dangerous Man in America in Context: Daniel Ellsberg and the Pentagon Papers,
PBS POV, http://www.pbs.org/pov/mostdangerousman/photo_gallery_background.php
(last visited Jan. 31, 2012).
177. See POSNER, supra note 39, at 108–09. R
178. Id. at 108.
179. Judge Posner clearly misreads the holding of Bartnicki—the media is protected as
long as they do nothing illegal short of publication—by stating that if the information’s
source does something illegal to leak the information, the media is an accomplice by tak-
ing the information. See id.; Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001).
180. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011).
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sial Supreme Court decisions of the last session. In the decision, the
Court embraced a broad definition of matter of public concern:
Speech deals with matters of public concern when it can “be fairly
considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other
concern to the community,” or when it “is a subject of legitimate
news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and
concern to the public.”181
To determine if speech is of private or public concern, courts must
consider “content, form, and context of that speech, as revealed by
the whole record.”182 The Court continued, “[i]n considering con-
tent, form, and context, no factor is dispositive, and it is necessary to
evaluate all the circumstances of the speech, including what was said,
where it was said, and how it was said.”183
The Snyder family sued the WBC for protesting the military fu-
neral of their son and causing them great emotional distress.184 The
WBC held signs that read “God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,”
“America is Doomed,” “Fag Troops,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,”
“Pope in Hell,” and “You’re Going to Hell.”185 The issue posed to the
Court was whether private person plaintiffs are required to prove ac-
tual malice in order to get damages for their claim of intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress when the subject of the speech was a
matter of public concern. Nevertheless, the Court’s opinion fails to
discuss actual malice at all, noting that the WBC could not be pun-
ished for their speech, because it was on a matter of public con-
cern.186 The Court did not use the traditional balancing test to decide
the case, suggesting that, at least for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, the key factor was whether or not the speech at issue is
about a private or public issue.187 In this way, the opinion suggests
that the Court is categorically including speech about matters of public
concern into the realm of First Amendment protection.
Indeed, the Court held that its definition of what constitutes a
matter of public concern is broad enough to encompass WBC’s offen-
181. Id. at 1216 (citations omitted) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146
(1983); City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004)).
182. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Dun & Broadstreet, Inc. v. Green-
moss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1978)).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1213.
185. Id. at 1216–17.
186. See id. at 1219 (“Given that Westboro’s speech was at a public place on a matter of
public concern, that speech is entitled to ‘special protection’ under the First
Amendment.”).
187. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\46-3\SAN305.txt unknown Seq: 32 16-MAY-12 11:45
814 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
sive slogans.188 The Court recognized, “[w]hile these messages may
fall short of refined social or political commentary, the issues they
highlight—the political and moral conduct of the United States and
its citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and
scandals involving the Catholic clergy—are matters of public
import.”189
Before Snyder, what constituted a matter of public concern was
less clear. Scholars were concerned that the doctrine privileged politi-
cal speech to the detriment of other core First Amendment speech:
“The public-concern test arguably puts in constitutional jeopardy First
Amendment protection of art, entertainment, scientific speech, and
any other category of speech not directly related to self-government. It
also, quite undemocratically, leaves the judiciary with the task of de-
ciding what is and is not relevant to public discourse.”190 Now the op-
posite concern seems valid: what speech is not a matter of public
concern? The Court announced its rule as though it was embedded in
precedent, but really, this expansive reading of matter of public con-
cern is quite new and has potentially far-reaching implications for
First Amendment jurisprudence.
One such implication is that the information published by
WikiLeaks should be categorically sheltered under the expansive um-
brella provided by the Snyder v. Phelps definition of matter of public
concern. WikiLeaks publishes information about matters of public
concern, informing potential submitters that it accepts “restricted or
censored material of political, ethical, diplomatic or historical
significance.”191
The Guantanamo Bay prisoner dossiers, diplomatic cables regard-
ing the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and Collateral Murder video
provide U.S. citizens with the information necessary to make in-
formed opinions about our nation’s foreign policy and our govern-
ment’s day-to-day performance. It is hard to think of topics that better
fit the definition of public concern. As discussed above, WikiLeaks did
not illegally obtain the truthful information it published. Further-
more, since Synder’s expansive definition of matters public concern
easily encompasses all of WikiLeaks’ disclosures of government infor-
mation, WikiLeaks should be constitutionally protected.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Matthew J. Coleman, The “Ultimate Question”: A Limited Argument for Trafficking in
Stolen Speech, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 559, 586 (2002).
191. Submissions, supra note 175. R
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V. The Few Existing War on Terror Cases Suggest
Limitations on the Special Protection for Speech
Regarding Matters of Public Concern
Despite recent United States involvement in two wars, somewhat
bizarrely, few published cases involve courts struggling with the ten-
sion between the First Amendment and government attempts to
squelch social protest related to the War on Terror. Nevertheless, two
recent cases, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project and Weiss v. Casper,
merit discussion because they give little deference to speech regarding
a matter of public concern. Such a result disregards a key purpose of
the First Amendment: checking government power. The results are
ironic considering the Court’s willingness to privilege the WBC’s ex-
treme speech because it is focused on public issues, although WBC’s
speech caused great distress to a private family and arguably lacks the
capacity to serve as an effective challenge to government policy.
A. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Protect
In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Court held that the gov-
ernment can constitutionally restrict the expressive association rights
of academics who “knowingly provide material support” to terrorists
through speech (training, engaging in political advocacy, etc.) that
advances the groups’ legitimate activities.192 The Court claimed to use
strict scrutiny but basically subjected the statute to rational basis scru-
tiny, deferring to the consensus reached by Congress and the Execu-
tive.193 Moreover, the Court defines national security broadly as “the
national defense, foreign relations, or economic interests of the
United States.”194 It nonetheless ignores the lofty language of the
Daily Mail principle and conflicts with the Court’s later decision in
Snyder regarding First Amendment protection for all matters of public
concern. Holder thus suggests that when it comes to speech that has
the potential to impact policy, the Court is less willing to embrace a
categorical approach.
B. Weise v. Casper
In Weise v. Casper, the plaintiffs attended a speech by President
Bush, given in his official capacity as President of the United States.195
192. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2726–30 (2010).
193. See id. at 2723–24, 2727–30.
194. Id. at 2713.
195. Weise v. Casper, 593 F.3d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir. 2010).
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Plaintiff Weise’s car, which she drove to the event, sported a “No More
Blood for Oil” bumper sticker.196 Volunteers admitted plaintiffs be-
cause they met all of the qualifications for entry (obtaining tickets
from their congressman after showing their driver’s licenses and writ-
ing down their names). Nevertheless, they were soon “escorted from
the event and not allowed to reenter. . . . because of the bumper
sticker on Ms. Weise’s vehicle.”197 Further, “being publicly and promi-
nently ejected from the audience in this manner caused extreme em-
barrassment and humiliation to the [p]laintiffs.”198 The plaintiffs did
not, nor did they intend to, disrupt the event; rather they were re-
moved solely because of the political speech appearing on Ms. Weise’s
vehicle.199
The Tenth Circuit held that the right of silent attendees not to be
ejected from a presidential speech, based on a dissenting opinion dis-
played on a bumper sticker on their car, was not clearly established at
time of the violation and granted the government volunteers qualified
immunity: “Although Defendants ejected them from the event,
[p]laintiffs have identified no authority suggesting that mere attend-
ance is transformed into speech or even expressive activity because of
their speech elsewhere.”200
As pointed out by the dissent, the court gave no deference to the
fact that the bumper sticker expressed an opinion about a matter of
public concern—criticism of the government’s war policy.201 If “God
Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11” is seemingly categorically pro-
tected by the First Amendment in Snyder because it is a matter of pub-
lic concern,202 then it is difficult to distinguish Ms. Weise’s “No More
Blood for Oil” bumper sticker.
Overall, these two War on Terror cases point out that courts may
be reluctant to protect speech under the First Amendment when that
speech comes from people with more potential to sway public opinion
than WBC. Nonetheless, this reluctance to fully embrace a categorical
approach for all matters of public concern broadly defined makes
sense. The Daily Mail principle is a fledging doctrine supported prima-
rily by the public’s need to have access to information that is vital to
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1172 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 1165 (majority opinion).
200. Id. at 1169.
201. Id. at 1170–71 (Holloway, J. dissenting).
202. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216 (2011).
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the health of our democracy, not protecting every statement that is
tangentially public-focused.
As far as WikiLeaks is concerned, the speech at issue is more
clearly protected, as publishing the leaked diplomatic cables and
Guantanamo prisoner dossiers is the bread and butter of the Daily
Mail principle—protecting publishers of previously undisclosed gov-
ernment information that was illegally obtained by a source and about
a matter of public concern.
Conclusion
This Comment has suggested that the government, in its conflict
with WikiLeaks will be unable to impose a prior restraint on future
publications of undisclosed government information or successfully
prosecute Assange under the Espionage Act. This is primarily because
publishers receive heightened First Amendment protection on mat-
ters of public concern, what this Comment has called a “categorical
inclusion” into the First Amendment. The concept of a categorical
inclusion stems from the Supreme Court’s decision in Bartnicki v. Vop-
per, the most recent in the Daily Mail line of cases and is strengthened
through the Court’s recent expansion of the definition of what consti-
tutes a matter of public concern in Snyder v. Phelps.
Such a rule provides clarity to publishers, thus eliminating other-
wise likely chilling effects on speech: “Clear rules are essential in the
realm of free speech, and that is one reason why we grant the govern-
ment so much authority to restrict the speech of its own employ-
ees.”203 Furthermore, revealing government secrets can serve as an
effective check on government power: “Publication of information
pertaining to national defense sheds light on the inner workings of
government, promotes self-governance, and provides an important
check on government malfeasance and abuse.”204
Robust First Amendment protection for matters of public con-
cern requires the government to avoid punishing publishers. Instead,
the government is encouraged to more aggressively prosecute leakers
or restrict access to sensitive information to keep its secrets confiden-
tial. For example, in response to the WikiLeaks releases, the Obama
administration recently issued an executive order tightening access to
203. Espionage Act Hearing, supra note 41, at 8 (statement of Geoffrey R. Stone, Profes- R
sor & Former Dean, Univ. of Chi. Law Sch.).
204. Derigan A. Silver, National Security and the Press: The Government’s Ability to Prosecute
Journalists for the Possession or Publication of National Security Information, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y
447, 472–73 (2008).
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the government’s classified networks to prevent future leaks.205 The
executive order provides for agency auditing systems and an inter-
agency Insider Threat Task Force that will be responsible for “deter-
ring, detecting, and mitigating insider threats, including the
safeguarding of classified information from exploitation, compromise,
or other unauthorized disclosure . . . .”206 While this response is anti-
thetical to transparency, it is constitutionally preferable to the govern-
ment prosecuting publishers. Moreover, this response is a sign that
the Obama administration recognizes its constitutional limitations in
this area.
We cannot simply defer to the government about the possible
harms from publication of previously undisclosed government infor-
mation, as these harms are likely to be exaggerated. As mentioned
above, there is a serious problem of over-classification: “[T]here are
great pressures that lead both government officials and the public to
overstate the potential harm of publication in times of national
anxiety.”207
Overall, a categorical protection for publishers of previously un-
disclosed government information is necessary in order to do justice
to the First Amendment. As Assange noted:
It will be encouragement to every other publisher to publish fear-
lessly. . . . If we’re talking about creating threats to small publishers
to stop them from publishing, the U.S. has lost its way. It has abro-
gated its founding traditions. It has thrown the First Amendment
in the bin. Because publishers must be free to publish.208
205. Exec. Order No. 13,587, 76 Fed. Reg. 63,811 (Oct. 7, 2011).
206. Id. § 6.1.
207. Espionage Act Hearing, supra note 41, at 8 (statement of Geoffrey R. Stone, Profes- R
sor & Former Dean, Univ. of Chi. Law Sch.).
208. Julian Assange, The Man Behind WikiLeaks, supra note 60. R
